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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 43688
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-5957
v. )
)
ANDREW SCOTT GOMEZ, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
) IN SUPPORT OF
Defendant-Appellant. ) PETITION FOR REVIEW
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Scott Gomez asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho
Court of Appeals in State v. Gomez, 2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 460 (May 9, 2017)
(hereinafter, Opinion). He contends the Opinion applied the incorrect standard to determine
whether an evidentiary error prejudiced Mr. Gomez. He also contends the Opinion unreasonably
expanded precedent to hold an act of constructive possession and an act of actual possession
were alternative factual means of the same crime, rather than separate criminal incidents. These
special and important reasons warrant review.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In  the  Opinion,  the  Court  of  Appeals  provided  a  summary  of  the  charged  criminal
conduct:
At 2:30 a.m., officers observed a vehicle parked in a darkened and
secluded portion of a commercial parking lot. As one of the officers approached
the vehicle, he noticed two individuals inside—Gomez sat in the driver’s seat, and
a  woman,  later  identified  as  Jennifer  Thompson,  sat  in  the  passenger  seat.  The
officer questioned the individuals about what they were doing in the parked
vehicle. Both individuals appeared nervous and gave inconsistent answers about
what they were doing, where they had been, and where they were going. After
receiving conflicting stories, the officer became suspicious and requested that
dispatch send a drug dog to the scene. Upon arrival, the drug dog alerted
positively to the vehicle, prompting the officers to search the vehicle for illegal
substances.
The officers’ search of the vehicle revealed baggies of methamphetamine
in a makeup bag on the passenger floor and in an eyeglass case in Thompson’s
bra, a digital scale, loose oxycodone pills, and a backpack containing marijuana.
Gomez admitted to police that he had agreed to transport Thompson in the vehicle
in exchange for some methamphetamine. Following Gomez’s arrest, he also
admitted that he had a pipe in his underwear and that he had smoked
methamphetamine earlier in the day. Forensic analysis later revealed that the pipe
contained residue that tested positive as methamphetamine.
The State charged Gomez with possession of a controlled substance, Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. The
State also charged Gomez with a persistent violator enhancement, I.C. § 19-2514.
(Opinion, p.2.) Mr. Gomez proceeded to trial. (See App. Br., pp.3–6 (overview of trial
proceedings).) The State pursued three theories of methamphetamine possession. Specifically,
the State argued the jury could find Mr. Gomez guilty based on:  (1) his admission to smoking
methamphetamine; (2) his constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine; or (3)
his actual possession of the traceable residue in the pipe in his underwear. (Opinion, pp.2–3; see
also App. Br., pp.3–6, 14–15.) In addition, over Mr. Gomez’s objection, the district court
admitted evidence of the backpack of marijuana as relevant to the possession of
methamphetamine charge. (Opinion, p.2; see also App. Br., pp.5–6.) The jury was instructed on
actual and constructive possession, but was not given a specific unanimity instruction. (R., p.108;
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Opinion, p.7.) The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (Opinion, p.3; R., pp.116–17.) The district court sentenced him
to ten years, with two years fixed, for possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.120–22.)
Mr. Gomez timely appealed. (R., pp.126–27.) On appeal, he raised three issues. First, he
argued the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt his constructive possession of
Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. (App. Br., pp.8–11.) Specifically, he asserted the State did
not present sufficient evidence of his control of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine since
Mr. Gomez would not receive any methamphetamine from Ms. Thompson until after he gave her
a ride.  (App. Br., pp.8–12.) Second, he argued the district court’s failure to give a unanimity
instruction for possession of methamphetamine, in light of the three separate criminal incidents
of possession alleged by the State, amounted to fundamental error. (App. Br., pp.12–20.) Third,
he argued the district court erred by admitting evidence of the backpack of marijuana pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) as it was irrelevant propensity evidence.1 (App. Br., pp.21–26.)
The Court of Appeals agreed in part with Mr. Gomez, but ultimately affirmed his
judgment of conviction. First, the Court of Appeals held the district court erred by admitting the
marijuana evidence. (Opinion, pp.3–5.) Even so, the Court of Appeals determined the State
proved the admission of the propensity evidence was harmless. (Opinion, pp.5–6.) Second,
although the Court of Appeals held Mr. Gomez’s actual possession of the pipe residue and his
constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine were merely alternative factual
theories, the Court of Appeals accepted the State’s concession that Mr. Gomez’s admission to
smoking methamphetamine was a separate criminal incident. (Opinion, pp.6–11.) As such, the
Court of Appeals held Mr. Gomez was entitled to a unanimity instruction. (Opinion, p.11.) The
1 With respect to this issue, Mr. Gomez also argued the State’s offer of proof in the district court
was insufficient. (App. Br., pp.23–25.)
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Court of Appeals also held Mr. Gomez met the second prong of the fundamental error
standard—that the error was plain from the record and his trial counsel’s failure to object was not
a tactical or strategic decision. (Opinion, pp.11–13.) Even though Mr. Gomez established a clear
violation of an unwaived constitutional right, the Court of Appeals held Mr. Gomez did not show
any prejudice. (Opinion, pp.13–14.) Third, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
determine whether the evidence was sufficient for Mr. Gomez’s alleged constructive possession
of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. (Opinion, p.14.) The Court of Appeals reasoned, even if
the evidence was insufficient, it could presume the jury premised its verdict on the other,
alternative factual basis of his actual possession of the traceable residue in the pipe. (Opinion,
p.14.)
Mr. Gomez timely petitioned for review by this Court.
5
ISSUE
Are there special and important reasons for this Court to grant review?
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ARGUMENT
There Are Special And Important Reasons For This Court To Grant Review
A. Introduction
Mr. Gomez raised three issues on appeal: erroneous admission of marijuana evidence,
fundamental error for the absence of a unanimity instruction, and insufficiency of the evidence
for one of the possession theories. For the first evidentiary error, Mr. Gomez asserts the Court of
Appeals misapplied the harmless error standard. For the second unanimity instruction error,
Mr. Gomez contends the Court of Appeals improperly held an allegation of actual possession
and  an  allegation  of  constructive  possession  were  the  same  criminal  incident.  Accordingly,  he
respectfully requests this Court grant his petition for review.
B. Standards For Granting Review
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that a petition for review “will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons.” I.A.R. 118(b). The Court’s grant of review is
discretionary, and the Court may consider a number of factors. I.A.R. 118(b). These factors
include: “Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not heretofore
determined by the Supreme Court,” and “[w]hether the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court or of
the United States Supreme Court.” I.A.R. 118(b)(1)–(2). “The brief in support of the petition for
review must address the criteria for review set out in [the factors in I.A.R. 118(b)], and
discussion and argument should be limited to the criteria for review.” I.A.R. 118(c).
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C. Review Is Warranted Because The Opinion Relied On Overwhelming Evidence To Hold
A Preserved Error Was Harmless And Held A Unanimity Instruction Was Not Required
Despite Three Distinct Theories Of Possession
Mr. Gomez focuses on two reasons for review of this case. First, he contends the Court of
Appeals erred by examining whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt instead of
whether the error contributed to the verdict actually obtained for a preserved error. Second, he
contends the Court of Appeals erred by holding actual and constructive possession of separate
contraband items were one criminal incident, which later resulted in the Opinion’s erroneous
conclusion on the prejudice to Mr. Gomez due to the absence of a specific unanimity instruction.
1. The  Opinion  Used  The  Incorrect  Harmless  Error  Standard  For  Improperly
Admitted Propensity Evidence
On appeal, Mr. Gomez argued the district court erred by admitting evidence of a
backpack of marijuana pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (App. Br., pp.21–26.)
Mr. Gomez asserted the marijuana evidence was not relevant any issue other than criminal
propensity. (See App. Br., pp.21–26; App. Reply Br., pp.8–13.) The Court of Appeals agreed:
“[W]e conclude that the evidence of the marijuana was inadmissible as improper character
evidence that was relevant only to show Gomez’s criminal propensity.2” (Opinion, p.5.)
The Court of Appeals then turned to prejudice. (Opinion, pp.5–6.) As a preserved error,
the State had the burden to show the erroneous admission of propensity evidence did not harm
Mr. Gomez. (App. Br., p.26; Resp. Br., pp.18–19.) In the Opinion, the Court of Appeals initially
referenced the correct harmless error standard. The Court of Appeals stated:
2 This Court’s recent decision in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574 (2017)—which held
“evidence previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the
criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence”—was pertinent to the Court of Appeals’
analysis. (Opinion, pp.3–4; see also Respt. Br., pp.16–19; App. Letter of Supp. Authority.)
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The State argues that even if the court erred by admitting the evidence of
marijuana, the error was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial.
Idaho Criminal Rule 52; State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171 (Ct. App. 1983).
The State bears the burden of proving harmless error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 225 (2010). To meet this burden, the State must show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the case. Id.
(Opinion, p.5.) This Court has also described the State’s burden as “demonstrating to the
appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to
the jury’s verdict.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Yet, after the Opinion referenced the correct standard, the Court of Appeals applied the
incorrect one. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
In support of its argument, the State points to the overwhelming evidence
presented during trial indicating Gomez was guilty of possessing
methamphetamine. The State maintains that evidence that Gomez was also
transporting marijuana would not have affected the jury’s guilty verdict on the
methamphetamine  possession  charge.  To  establish  guilt  on  the  possession  of
methamphetamine charge, the State was required to prove that Gomez knowingly
possessed methamphetamine; i.e.,  that  he  had  knowledge  of  the  presence  of  the
drug. See I.C. § 37-2732(c); State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64 (2005). The
requisite knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance may be proved by
direct evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances. State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 242 (1999).
The record indicates that after his arrest, Gomez admitted to officers that
Gomez had smoked methamphetamine earlier in the evening. Gomez also told
officers that Gomez had a pipe hidden in his underwear. After officers retrieved
the pipe from deep within Gomez’s underwear, Gomez admitted that the pipe had
been smoked out of previously. The officer testified during trial to observing a
white  residue  on  the  inside  of  the  pipe,  which  was  consistent  with
methamphetamine burning. During trial, a forensic expert testified that she also
was able to observe a small amount of residue in the pipe and, upon forensic
analysis, that residue tested positive as being methamphetamine.
Based upon the cumulative evidence presented by the State during trial,
there was overwhelming evidence that Gomez had knowledge that the residue
within the pipe was methamphetamine and that by admitting to possession of the
pipe, Gomez also admitted to possessing the methamphetamine within the pipe.
Thus, we are persuaded that because the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming,
any error in the admission of the marijuana evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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(Opinion, pp.5–6 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).) Thus, the Court of Appeals examined
whether overwhelming evidence cured the error, not whether the error contributed to or affected
the actual jury’s verdict.
As outlined by this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the harmless error
standard does not allow the appellate court to act as a second jury. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the Chapman harmless error standard “instructs the
reviewing court to consider . . . not what effect the constitutional error might generally be
expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in
the case at hand.” 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). The United States
Supreme  Court  further  explained,  “The  inquiry,  in  other  words,  is  not  whether,  in  a  trial  that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. This must
be the standard, the United States Supreme Court reasoned, “because to hypothesize a guilty
verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that
verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, this
Court in Perry took note of the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the California
court’s “flawed” harmless error standard that overly relied on “overwhelming evidence” to deem
errors harmless. 150 Idaho at 223 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23). Accordingly, this Court
acknowledged, “the correct standard required appellate courts to ask ‘whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.’” Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).
Here, the Court of Appeals examined the overwhelming evidence against Mr. Gomez to
hold the erroneous admission of propensity evidence was harmless. This was inconsistent with
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this Court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s precedent. For this reason, Mr. Gomez
respectfully requests that this Court grant review to apply the correct harmless error standard.
2. The Opinion Incorrectly Held A Unanimity Instruction Was Not Required Despite
Three Distinct Theories Of Possession, One Of Which Was Supported By
Insufficient Evidence, Resulting In Prejudice To Mr. Gomez
Pursuant to fundamental error doctrine, Mr. Gomez argued the district court erred by
failing to give a specific unanimity instruction. (App. Br., pp.12–20.) He pointed to the three
separate theories of methamphetamine possession employed by the State to obtain a guilty
verdict: (1) Mr. Gomez’s admission to smoking methamphetamine; (2) his constructive
possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine in his vehicle; or (3) his actual possession of
the traceable residue in the pipe found at the jail in his underwear. Mr. Gomez also argued the
evidence was insufficient to prove one of the theories—constructive possession—because he did
not have control over Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. (App. Br., pp.8–12.) In its brief, the
State conceded the first theory of smoking methamphetamine was a separate criminal incident.
(Respt. Br., pp.13–14.) The Court of Appeals disagreed with Mr. Gomez’s argument that the
alleged constructive possession and actual possession were separate incidents. (Opinion, pp.8–
10.) The Court of Appeals also declined to address the sufficiency argument because it reasoned
the jury could find Mr. Gomez guilty on the alternative factual basis of actual possession.
(Opinion, p.14.) However, the Court of Appeals accepted the State’s concession on the smoking
methamphetamine theory and thus held Mr. Gomez was entitled to a unanimity instruction.
(Opinion, p.11.)  In addition, the Court of Appeals held Mr. Gomez had shown no tactical or
strategic reason for trial counsel’s failure to request a unanimity instruction. (Opinion, pp.11–
13.) Despite the clear violation of an unwaived constitutional right, the Court of Appeals held the
11
error was harmless. (Opinion, pp.13–14.) Mr. Gomez respectfully requests this Court grant
review because the Opinion’s analysis on these interrelated issues was in error.
With respect to the constructive possession and actual possession theories, Mr. Gomez
argued these were, in fact, two separate and distinct criminal incidents. (App. Br., pp.14–16.) To
this end, Mr. Gomez distinguished his case from the recent decision in State v. Southwick, 158
Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014). In Southwick, the Court of Appeals held two acts of constructive
possession of methamphetamine (residue found on a scale between two car seats and crystals
located in a baggie inside the car’s passenger door compartment) were alternative factual means
to prove the same criminal incident. Id. at 177, 182. Applying Southwick, the Court of Appeals
reasoned in this case:
Similar to Southwick, Gomez was charged with a single count of possessing a
controlled substance on a single date and in a single location.3 The criminal
complaint did not specify the means by which that possession occurred. During
trial,  the  State  alleged  alternative  factual  grounds  from  which  the  jury  could
conclude that Gomez was guilty of the single discrete crime of possession of
methamphetamine on that date and in that location. Just as it was not dispositive
in Southwick that the methamphetamine was found in different locations within
the vehicle, it is also not dispositive that the methamphetamine in this case was
found in multiple locations inside the vehicle and on Gomez’s person. Examining
Gomez’s apparent intent to transport Thompson in exchange for
methamphetamine,  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  his  objective  was  possession  of
methamphetamine. Therefore, we conclude that the State’s allegations of actual
and constructive possession constitute alternative theories upon which it relied in
proving the single crime of possession charged.4
3 The Information charged: “That the Defendant, ANDREW SCOTT GOMEZ, on or about the
27th day of April, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a
controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.” (R., pp.23–
24.) The jury instruction for the offense was similarly vague. (R., p.106.)
4 The Court of Appeals also found a California case to be persuasive. People v. Ortiz, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
In Ortiz, the state charged the defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon
and carrying a firearm in a vehicle, as well as related enhancements to those
charges. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 925. During trial, the jury heard conflicting evidence as
to whether the defendant actually possessed a gun, actually possessed a Taser,
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(Opinion, p.10.) But here, in contrast to Southwick, the State did not present two alternative
theories of constructive possession. The State argued Mr. Gomez was guilty of actual possession
of the traceable residue found in a pipe in his underwear at jail and guilty of constructive
possession of the methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson’s person when she was in his vehicle.
(See App. Br., 14–15 (citing trial transcript).) These are two entirely separate incidents based on
two  different  criminal  acts.  One  requires  proof  of  actual  physical  possession  of  the  controlled
substance; the other requires proof of “the power and intent to exercise dominion and control”
over the substance. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178; State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App.
1994). Mr. Gomez submits the Opinion has unreasonably expanded Southwick through its
application to this case because now two separate crimes of possession are considered alternative
factual means.
Relatedly, Mr. Gomez maintains the Court of Appeals erred in its resolution of his
sufficiency of the evidence argument and its determination of prejudice due to the absence of a
unanimity instruction. The Court of Appeals did not address his sufficiency argument because it
concluded, even if the evidence was inadequate, the jury could find Mr. Gomez guilty based on
constructively possessed someone else’s gun, or constructively possessed
someone else’s Taser. Id.
(Opinion, pp.9–10.) The alleged actual or constructive possession of the Taser or gun occurred in
the same vehicle during the same time period. Ortiz, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 912–13. The California
appellate court disagreed with the defendant’s argument that a unanimity instruction was
required, “concluding the state had merely advanced multiple theories of a single discrete crime
and not multiple acts constituting multiple crimes.” (Opinion, p.10.) But see State v. King, 878
P.2d 466, 468–69 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding unanimity instruction required when the
State’s evidence showed two distinct instances of drug possession “occurring at different times,
in different places, and involving two different containers”: constructive possession of
contraband in jointly occupied vehicle and actual possession of contraband on defendant’s
person during inventory search at jail). Unlike Ortiz,  the alleged acts here did not occur in the
same location or at the same time.
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the alternative, and unchallenged, factual basis of actual possession of the pipe residue. (Opinion,
p.14.) Yet the sufficiency argument was intertwined with the unanimity issue—Mr. Gomez’s
prejudice argument was premised in part on the insufficiency of the evidence for constructive
possession. (App. Br., pp.11–12, 19–20.) If the evidence was insufficient for constructive
possession, and the actual and constructive possessions were indeed separate incidents, then the
jury was presented with three separate incidents, one of which was legally insufficient. It is
entirely possible some jurors found Mr. Gomez guilty relying on actual possession, others found
him guilty based on constructive possession, others found him guilty based on the smoking
methamphetamine admission, and still others combined elements of all three. Without peering
into the “black box” of the jury, it is all but impossible to know how the individual jurors
compiled the elements of the offense. See State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000) (“In cases
where it is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect
legal theory, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new
trial.”).Therefore, Mr. Gomez submits the Court of Appeals erred by finding no prejudice due to
the absence of the unanimity instruction, in light of the three separate incidents of criminal
conduct and the insufficient evidence for one incident.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for review.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2017.
_________/s/________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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